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The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic
of Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of
Legal Norms
Professor Doctor Wolfgang Zeidler *
President of the Federal Constitutional Court
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Constitutional
Court is the principal body of constitutional jurisdiction.' The Court's
exclusive jurisdiction is to decide constitutional questions arising under
the Federal Republic's Constitution, the Basic Law (das Grundgesetz). A
constitution, particularly one that contains an extensive catalogue of ba-
sic rights binding on all public authority, will necessitate a greater degree
of interpretation than other legal norms. Unlike other courts of last re-
sort, access to the Federal Constitutional Court is limited, except in the
case of constitutional complaints, to state and federal governments, state
and federal courts, and parliamentary groups such as party factions and
minorities in national and state legislatures. The role of the Federal
Constitutional Court, therefore, is particularly significant, considering
the potential far reaching effect of its decisions.
This Article briefly examines the decisions of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, with particular emphasis on the categories, content and ef-
fect of the Court's opinions on the constitutionality of legal norms.
Specific examples of prior Court decisions are provided to aid in the un-
derstanding of various concepts.
I. Categories of Disputes
Nearly all of the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, cover-
ing fourteen types of disputes, is defined in the Basic Law.2 The most
significant areas of review involve abstract and concrete judicial review
and constitutional complaints. There are no statutory provisions for a
* This Article is adapted from the report on the Federal Constitutional Court delivered by Pres-
ident Zeidler at the 7th Conference of European Constitutional Courts in Lisbon, Portugal, April 26-
30, 1987. The English version of President Zeidler's paper, translated by Albert K. Wimmer, is the
sole responsibility of the Notre Dame Law Review. President Zeidler kindly authorized the translation
but has not reviewed the English text. All rights reserved by Wolfgang Zeidler.
1 In addition to the Federal Constitutional Court most individual states have state constitu-
tional courts which primarily safeguard the observance of state constitutional law. The state consti-
tutional courts are particularly responsible for deciding disputes concerning the laws regulating
schools and their organization and for cases of constitutional examination of legally required consol-
idations of municipalities and other municipal reorganizations. Because of its special status, Berlin
does not have a state constitutional court. Schleswig-Holstein took advantage of the opportunity to
refer to the Federal Constitutional Court any decision involving state constitutional disputes. For a
comprehesive treatment of state constitutional courts, see LANDESVERASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT (Ba-
den-Baden 1983).
2 See GRUNDGESETZ art. 13.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
preventative or an advisory judicial review of legal norms.3 The Law
Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court originally provided for the
possibility of obtaining advisory opinions. The provision was soon
dropped, however, in view of the difficulties that arose in conjunction
with the binding nature of such decisions.
4
A. Abstract Judicial Review
The federal government, a state government, or one-third of the
Bundestag may require the Federal Constitutional Court to determine the
compatability of federal or state law with the Basic Law as well as the
compatibility of state law with any other federal law. All legal norms,
including laws properly passed by Parliament, statutory orders, by-laws
adopted by municipalities or other types of corporate bodies may be sub-
jected to this review. This procedure may also be used to ascertain the
validity of a norm after a court of law, an administrative authority, any
body of the Federal Republic or a state has refused to implement the law
because it was not compatible with the Basic Law.5 In practice, the party
requesting an abstract judicial review is frequently the political opposi-
tion in the Bundestag or a state government ruled by the opposition party.
Commentators critically note that it is only the political disputes which
were unsuccessfully resolved in the Bundestag that are continued in the
courtroom. Because an abstract judicial review forces the Federal Con-
stitutional Court to decide the constitutionality of a legal norm without
access to sufficient information regarding the implementation of the
norm or its implications, this review procedure has been subject to
criticism.
B. Concrete Judicial Review
Any court that employs a legal norm, upon which its decision de-
pends, must first examine the compatibility of this norm with a higher
norm, especially the Basic Law. If a court reaches the conclusion, mere
doubts will not suffice, that a law passed by Parliament, a formal law, is
not compatible with the Basic Law then the court must discontinue the
proceedings and certify the question of compatability to the Federal
Constitutional Court.6 The Court will only decide whether or not the
submitted legal norm is compatible with the Basic Law. 7 Subsequently, a
concrete ruling on the matter must be made by the proper specialized
court. The exclusive power of the Federal Constitutional Court to pro-
claim a formal law unconstitutional is intended to foreclose a lower court
3 Notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory authority, the Federal Constitutional Court
will review international treaties. Judicial review occurs as soon as the legislative procedures have
been completed, but before the (internal) consent law has been enacted, thus avoiding international
commitment to a treaty prior to a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court. See 1 BVeffGE 396,
410 [BVerfGE denotes the official reporter of the Federal Constitutional Court].
4 BVeffGG § 97 (version of March 12, 1951) (repealed July 21, 1956) [BVeffGG denotes the
Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court].
5 BVerfGG § 76.
6 This applies also if a state law violates the Basic Law or any other Federal law.
7 In practice, the original issue is often concretized-in the form of restrictions or enlarge-
ments-by the Federal Constitutional Court.
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from bypassing the will of the democratic legislature by means of declar-
ing a law unconstitutional.
8
C. Constitutional Complaints
Unlike the other methods of judicial review, a constitutional com-
plaint can be lodged by any person asserting a violation by a public au-
thority of either basic rights or certain other constitutional rights (such as
the right to be heard). The constitutional complaint can be lodged
against any act of public authority, including measures taken by adminis-
trative agencies or court decisions. However, available legal recourse
must be exhausted prior to any such review by the Federal Constitutional
Court.9 A constitutional complaint lodged directly against a law or legal
norm is only admissable if certain restrictive conditions are met. The
complainant himself must above all be presently and directly affected by
the law. Furthermore, the Court increasingly requires that it must be
unreasonable for the complainant to first seek relief by following the or-
dinary recourse of law.' 0
Regardless of the context of the constitutional complaint, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of the legal
norms, whether express or implied. As a result, numerous decisions of
the court on constitutional complaints concern the compatibility of laws
or other legal norms with the Basic Law. One must note here, however,
that a review of the constitutionality of a norm, within the framework of a
constitutional complaint proceeding, would be precluded when there re-
mains no question whatsoever about the subjective legal position of the
complainant but only about other objective rules and regulations of con-
stitutional law.' The practical impact of this limitation is curtailed by
the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court interprets the Basic Law to
include not only the grant of a general freedom to develop one's person-
ality but also as to incorporate the constitutional right to remain unen-
cumbered by public authority exercised with no constitutional basis. 12
As such, one must also examine within the framework of a constitutional
complaint objections claiming a deficiency of legislative authority of the
Federal Republic or citing a faulty drafting process.' 3
8 The Federal Constitutional Court did not infer that its monopoly power to proclaim a formal
law unconstitutional was limited to laws becoming effective after the enactment of the Basic Law
(post-constitutional laws) or laws enacted by post-constitutional legislators which incorporated laws
before the enactment of the Basic Law (pre-constitutional laws). See 63 BVerfGE 181, 188; 66
BVerfGE 248, 254-55; 70 BVerfGE 126, 130.
9 BVeffGG § 90(11).
10 See, e.g., 71 BVerfGE 305 (Order to Guarantee Milk Allotment); Judgment of February 25,
1986, 1 BvR 1384/85 and 30/86 (times set for survivors' upbringing).
11 66 BVerfGE 39, 64.
12 "Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in so far as he does
not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code."
GRUNDGESETZ art. 2(I).




D. Other Methods of Procedure
The incidental review of legal norms has arisen in the context of
judicial disputes between public bodies concerning the respective rights
and duties of not only the highest federal bodies but also of parliamen-
tary groups and parties as well.14 For example, the authority of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court to rule on complaints against decisions by the
Bundestag pertaining to the validity of elections led to a review of the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Election Laws.'
5
E. Legislative Omissions
Legislative omissions can also be the subject of a ruling by the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court.' 6 Such cases pose many problems, including
the determination of the unconstitutionality of a present legal condition
and appeals to the legislature. Although not intended to be exhaustive,
the following examples may serve as illustrative: Constitutionally re-
quired mandates, the constitutional duty to regulate by law the basic
rights and duties of a certain group of people, the constitutional duty of
the legislature to take into consideration changes in actual conditions, as
well as disparities which are incompatible with the principle of equality.
These examples range from cases involving genuine omission (the legis-
lature does not act in defiance of a specific constitutional mandate) and
lack of implementation (the legislature has not acted for a long time) to
discrimination (the legislature acted, but failed to consider a certain
group).
F. Standards of Review
The standard by which the Federal Constitutional Court reviews
legal norms is the Basic Law and/or any federal law in so far as it con-
cerns the compatibility of a state law with federal law.' 7 Accordingly, the
Basic Law must not only be understood as the sum total of individual
guarantees and organizational regulations, but also as a unity, as a sys-
tem which is characterized by certain value judgments, especially those
concerning basic human rights and the principles of constitutionality and
democracy. The constitutional rights not only serve as defenses against
the State but also as objective principles. The existence of constitutional
14 For instance, the Federal Constitutional Court handed down decisions on the tax treatment of
donations and contributions to political parties. Furthermore, it decided procedural rules (rooted in
law) concerning the formation of a special panel for handling sections of the budget plan which
needed to be kept secret, and on comprehensive subsidies for certain foundations which were closely
affiliated with political parties. Even such cases may lead to a limitation of review standards because
the Federal Constitutional Court is called upon to merely examine whether the contested measure-
which can also be a law-violates or threatens directly any constitutional rights of the petitioner. See,
e.g., Judgment ofJuly 14, 1986, 2 ByE 2/84 and 2 BvR 442/84.
15 16 BVerfGE 130. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
16 The problems involved in such cases are discussed infra at notes 19-65 and accompanying
text.
17 The Federal Constitutional Court, in accordance with the constitution, had to decide indepen-
dently whether a rule of international law represents a component of Federal law (which ranks below
the constitution) or whether it will directly generate rights and duties for the individual citizen. See
GRUNDGEsETz art. 1 (II). No constitutional complaint can be based on the assertion that the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights has been violated. See 64 BVerfGE 135, 157.
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rights can influence the procedures and organization of the political deci-
sion process and, within certain limitations, can also guarantee the sub-
jective right to share in Government services.18
II. Subject Matter of the Decisions
A. Nullity-Compatibility
If the Federal Constitutional Court comes to the conclusion that a
law is not compatible with the Basic Law, the Court "nullifies the law."' 19
This legal regulation is based on the traditional German doctrine which
states that a norm which violates a higher norm is void eo ipso and ex
tunc.20 The law also provides the Federal Constitutional Court with the
opportunity to nullify particular provisions of the same law as long as
these are incompatible with the constitution for the same reasons. 21 The
Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court already restricts the
effects of the nullity of an unconstitutional norm. For example, a new
trial is permissible in a criminal case if the final decision was based on an
unconstitutional legal norm. In all other cases, however, incontestable
decisions are sustained although they can no longer be enforced.22
In the event the Federal Constitutional Court determines that the
law subject to its review is compatible with the Basic Law, the Court pro-
claims the constitutionality of the contested legal regulation. Even in the
context of constitutional complaint procedures, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court may hold that a law is constitutional.2 3 Frequently, a deter-
mination of constitutionality by the Court is stated only in the reasons
which refute a constitutional complaint. 24
B. Partial Nullity
Rarely is there a need for the complete nullification of a law or other
legal norm. Nullification would be proper, however, when the authority
to decree a law is completely absent from the public body (for example,
the Federal Republic or a state)25 and/or if the remaining, constitution-
ally compatible provisions no longer possess any individual significance.
Such would be the situation where the unconstitutional provision is so
intimately connected with the entire law that it forms a comprehensive,
inseparable unit which cannot be divided into individual components
without losing its meaning and its justification.26
18 See 1978 EuGRZ 426 (validity and significance of the basic rights); Rupp v. Brunneck, Verfas-
sungsgerichtsbarkeit und gesetzgebende Gewalt, 102 AoR 1 (1977).
19 BVerfGG § 78 (first stentence). The original version of the law did not specify this as clearly
when it stated that the court "ascertains the nullity." See BVerfGG § 78 (first sentence) (version of
March 12, 1951).
20 It is interesting to note that this doctrine had its historical merits in that it managed to estab-
lish and to legitimize judicial review by courts.
21 BVerfGG § 78 (second sentence).
22 BVerfGG § 79.
23 See, e.g., 68 BVerfGE 193 (constitutional); 68 BVerfGE 176, 185 (unconstitutional).
24 Concerning the different effects, see infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., 61 BVerfGE 149, 151 (Government Liability Act).
26 57 BVerfGE 295, 334: 65 BVerfGE 325. 358.
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Even an individual legal provision must not always be entirely pro-
claimed unconstitutional and void. Restrictions on judicial review may
result from the issue of constitutional procedures. In the context of con-
crete judicial review, the limited range of the introduced issues-which
are often more clearly specified by the Federal Constitutional Court-
restricts the Court's ability to nullify an entire law. 27 The Federal Consti-
tutional Court may arrive at the conclusion that only part of a linguisti-
cally divisible provision is unconstitutional.
2 8
Finally, partial nullity may be assumed in the case of a requirement
not specifically mentioned in a particular law, or with respect to a particu-
lar application of the law. In 1982, for example, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court nullified legal provisions which conditioned "admission to
'medical school for the purpose of studying medicine as [a second aca-
demic major] on the requirement that [the study of medicine] meaning-
fully compliment the [first academic major], even in the case of
applicants who had begun their studies prior to the 1974-75 winter se-
mester in the belief that the possibility for such [a second academic ma-
jor] existed."
'29
C. Interpretations which Conform with the Constitution
Ever since the Federal Constitutional Court was impanelled, it prac-
ticed interpretations which conformed to the Basic Law. Such interpreta-
tions are functionally similar to partial nullification of a norm; they
specifically avoid the declaration of nullity. By engaging in this type of
interpretation, the legislature is spared from having the Federal Consti-
tutional Court pronounce the unconstitutionality of a provision-an act
which is often excessively valued by the political public.
If the wording of a law permits several interpretations, then the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court must choose the one which produces results
harmonious with the Basic Law. There is no room for any interpretation
that would lead to an unconstitutional result.30 The constitutionally ac-
ceptable interpretation also must not conflict with the wording and the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Accordingly, the normative
content of the law to be interpreted must not be determined anew and
the essential legislative goals must not be missed in the process.3 1 Ad-
mittedly, this applies only to those basic principles, determinations of
27 See, e.g., 70 BVerfGE 115, 116.
28 Such might be the case if the Court determined that one of several alternative requirements
for a particular act by the Government was unconstitutional or that the combination of several regu-
lations gave rise to an unconstitutional result. Specific examples include cases involving the consti-
tutionality of a requirement that nominations to a personnel committee be signed by one-tenth of
the eligible voters and where admission to the certification exam for tax accountants was conditioned
upon resignation from the Internal Revenue Service. 67 BVerfGE 369, 370; 69 BVerfGE 209, 210.
29 62 BVerfGE 117, 119.
30 One must distinguish from this the duty of all courts and appliers of the law to lend in a given
case the greatest possible force to the fundamental rights established by the constitution. For exam-
ple, courts must enforce freedom of speech while interpreting rules concerning civil law and profes-
sional rules and regulations. Occassionally, this is referred to as an interpretation which takes its
cues from the constitution. See, e.g., Simon, in GENERAL REPORT FOR THE 2ND CONFERENCE, 1974
EuGRZ 85, 86.
31 See 54 BVerfGE 277, 299 with its additional references.
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value and regulative purpose, which are recognizably expressed by the
law.
The statements by legislative committees or individual members of
the legislative bodies concerning the significance of a normative compo-
nent or concept (or scope of an individual provision), its handling, and
result do not constitute binding guidelines for the courts, no matter how
illuminating they might be in determining meaning. The existence of
adverse legislative history, however, occasionally proves problematic. In
1980, such a quandary resulted in a fairly rare decision by the plenum
session of the Federal Constitutional Court.32 Rather briefly, the full
court found that restricting the language of a statutory provision which
revised the legal recourse to the Federal High Court ofJustice in its func-
tion in civil matters as a Court of Appeals was proper, in light of the de
minimus restriction on legislative intent.
33
In another decision, the Federal Constitutional Court interpreted as
constitutionally conforming, a provision in the tax laws which afforded
unwed mothers and foster parents certain special benefits. The Court
concluded that fathers of illegitimate children-who are not specifically
covered by the wording of the law-could, in certain circumstances,34 be
considered "foster parents," in view of the constitutional requirement of
equality of illegitimate children.3 5 The Court premised its decision on
the assumption that the legislature would have augmented the provision
accordingly if it had recognized the omission.
By comparison, the Federal Constitutional Court rejected as an in-
terpretation which did not conform with the constitution, a National So-
cialist administrative order-that is, an order that reflected a totalitarian
administrative philosophy-which did not meet the constitutional re-
quirement of definiteness. It was deemed impossible to reinterpret such
a vague regulation without simultaneously examining whether the subse-
quent effect agreed at all with the intentions of the democratic legisla-
ture. A constitutionally conforming interpretation would have essentially
redefined the normative content, and to do so would not have been
within the purview of the Federal Constitutional Court.3 6 Indeed, by em-
ploying a constitutionally acceptable interpretation one must not disre-
gard the danger of shouldering the legislature with results it did not
intend.
Equally, and only slightly less problematical, is the functional rela-
tionship between the Federal Constitutional Court and the specialized
courts, especially the highest. In certain instances, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court may prescribe a constitutionally conforming interpretation
of a provision which a specialized court did not support in an earlier deci-
32 The Federal Constitutional Court is divided into two chambers, called senates, which have
exclusive memberships and exclusive jurisdiction over certain constititutional cases. The plenum, an
en banc session of the Court, meets only to address matters concerning the internal administration
of the Court as a whole, the disputes arising out of the wish of one senate to depart from a formal
ruling by the other, or the transfer ofjurisdiction from one senate to another.
33 54 BVerfGE 277, 298.
34 36 BVerfGE 126.
35 GRUNDGESETZ art. 6(V).
36 8 BVerfGE 71. See also 20 BVerfGE 150, 160.
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sion despite careful deliberations. Furthermore, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's specific mission authorizes it only to proclaim that a
certain interpretation is incompatible with the Basic Law. To do so, the
Court must demonstrate that an interpretation which is different from
the one held unconstitutional is indeed possible. The Court, however,
must leave undecided whether only the specified interpretation is possi-
ble or whether there is the possibility for additional constitutional inter-
pretations. Also, the Federal Constitutional Court is not authorized to
decide for the specialized courts whether only one of several differing
'interpretations is legitimate.
D. Recent Variations in the Decisions
The Federal Constitutional Court went beyond these quasi classic de-
cision techniques by creating an additional set of instruments which
make it possible to avoid the often undesirable ex-tunc effect of nullity
without having to accept for any period of time a condition which would
be considered unconstitutional. For example, the Court has proclaimed
a law or legal situation not "yet" unconstitutional, and therefore still tol-
erable, while appealing to the legislature for change, possibly within a
specified period of time. In other circumstances, the Court merely deter-
mined that a law was incompatible with the Basic Law but not simultane-
ously void.3
7
The reasons for such judicial actions vary.3 8 First, one ought to
avoid a deficiency in the regulation (and the prospect of legal chaos)
which results from nullifying a law. A decision by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court must not lead to a situation which could turn out to be con-
stitutionally even less compatible than the present one. Second, the
creative leeway of the legislature constitutes an important factor in the
deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court. This aspect occasion-
ally is combined with dogmatic and systematic reasoning. Essentially, it
is not the task of the Federal Constitutional Court to reach relevant deci-
sions in those cases affecting areas of the law which the legislature ne-
glected, despite its constitutional duty to regulate through the enactment
of laws. In any event, it is rather difficult to construe an omission as
"void." Third, a similar approach applies to those cases where the legis-
lature violates the Basic Law by granting to one group a benefit-in vio-
lation of the constitution-which it denied to another. Fourth, gradual
economic, technical, social, or legal developments may lead to situations
where a norm which was conceivably unobjectionable at the time of its
passage-possibly as a result of interaction with other norms-becomes
unconstitutional. In all these cases, the general rule is that the Federal
Constitutional Court proclaims that the current legal situation must be
changed, but allows the legislature to make the political decision which
will determine the nature of a future regulation.
37 This variation has been adopted by the legislature and included in the Law Concerning the
Federal Constitutional Court. See BVerfGG § 31(11)
38 See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
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E. Appeals Decisions
1. Avoiding Deficiencies in the Law and Constitutional Claims
a. Redrawing Electoral Districts
Within the context of the Federal Constitutional Court's authority to
ultimately review the validity of the Bundestag elections, the Court had to
struggle with the complaint that a shift in the population had gradually
led to an unconstitutional imbalance of the election districts. The Court
found that the shifts in population had developed gradually over time.
As such, it would be difficult to determine when the original constitu-
tional districting became unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court deter-
mined that the situation was still tolerable. At the same time, the Court
declared that it was the legislature's constitutional duty to pass new dis-
tricting laws during the current legislative session so that the next elec-
tions would be held in properly apportioned districts.3 9 Had the Federal
Constitutional Court nullified the election laws with respect to the essen-
tial apportionment and ultimately allowed a contest of the elections, the
Court would have been confronted immediately with the difficult task of
determining which legislative subcommittee would have been authorized
to pass new election laws regarding proper districting.
b. The Sales Tax Case
In contrast to the current value added tax system, the prior sales tax
system, which imposed a four percent levy on each sales transaction, dis-
torted competition by favoring larger businesses which, unlike smaller
businesses, had the ability to combine several stages of production and
distribution. The legislature had intended to avoid this inequality by au-
thorizing the Federal Government, through the use of legal orders, to
exempt certain transactions from taxation. However, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, several years prior to this authorization, had determined
that such legal orders were void for failure to meet the constitutional
requirements regarding the precision of an authorization to pass legal
orders. 40
To nullify the entire sales tax law would have meant national bank-
ruptcy. To declare unconstitutional only portions of the regulations was
practically impossible because of the difficulty of separating the nullified
sections from the valid sections. In the meantime, Parliament had
pushed for a reform of the Sales Tax Law. Unfortunately, the reform
movement was further complicated by the influence of a recent trend
among European Communities to streamline regulations. In view of
this, the Federal Constitutional Court arrived at the conclusion that the
existing inequality had to be temporarily accepted by the disadvantaged
businesses. In addition, the legislature was to be granted a certain grace
period until it passed a new law. The Court assumed that the legislature,
absent unforeseen problems, could bring the initiated reform to a con-
39 16 BVerfGE 130.
40 7 BVerfGE 282.
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clusion and eliminate the objectionable inequality without any further
delay.4
1
2. Appealing to the Legislature for Change
Several of the decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court holding
the legal situation constitutionally acceptable but requiring action by the
legislature involved the recodification of entire legal areas.
a. Defining the Rights of Illegitimate Children
One of the first decisions dealt with the specific constitutional task-
without a preemptory order for time-to create equal conditions for le-
gitimate and illegitimate children alike.42 In 1969, twenty years after the
passage of the Basic Law,43 the Federal Constitutional Court concluded
that enough time had elapsed to now permit the legislature to fulfill this
unmistakable constitutional mandate. The Court stated that the inequal-
ity which existed would only be acceptable until the end of the legislative
session. The Court further noted that the mandate for equality was suffi-
ciently clear, especially since it concerned family and inheritance law, to
be implemented directly by the courts should the legislature not act. The
Bundestag had already in hand a bill which was ready for adoption and
which was to accommodate the constitutional mandate. Thus the six
month deadline imposed by the Court (the time remaining in the ses-
sion) was not prohibitive.
The Federal Constitutional Court's announcement that courts were
to implement the will of the Basic Law in the event the Legislature failed
to fulfill the constitutional mandate within a specified period of time was
likely based on prior experience. Briefly, the Basic Law specifically man-
dated that any law which contradicted the principle of equality between
men and women was to remain in effect until its adaptation to the
changed legal status, but no later than March 31, 1953.4 4 Once this date
passed, the civil courts, which dealt with family matters, directly imple-
mented the principle of equal treatment in many areas of family law.
They did so for a period of three years until the emergence of legal re-
form. As early as 1953, the Court had demanded the implementation of
this practice, the constitutionality of which had been questioned by one
court.
4 5
b. Defining the Rights of Prisoners
Later decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that
the absence of legal regulations regarding the rights and duties of pris-
oners was not compatible with the Basic Law. Parliament, the Court
found, would need to pass laws concerning their basic legal rights. The
present state of affairs, however, was to be accepted for a certain interim
41 21 BVerfGE 12, 42.
42 GRUNDGE Ez art. 6(V). See also 25 BVerfGE 167.
43 Article 121 of the Constitution of 1919 contained a similar mandate.
44 GRUNDGESETZ art. 117(I).
45 3 BVerfGE 225.
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period. Traditionally, courts upheld directives issued by administrative
agencies which encroached on prisoners' rights. The applicability of the
principle of legal reservation to status situations (prisoners and students,
for example) was debated in the legal literature. Increased acceptance of
the principle, which provides that any encroachment on constitutional
rights must be authorized by law, had already led the legislature to im-
panel a subcommittee to draft such legislation. The Court stated that the
transitional period would expire at the end of the legislative session,
which, at the time, was still one and a half years hence.46 In view of the
subsequent early dissolution of the Bundestag, the Court extended the pe-
riod in a later ruling.47
As for the interim period, the Court made it clear that the powers of
the authorities and courts to encroach upon constitutional positions were
reduced to what was indispensable in a specific case in order to maintain
and conduct in an orderly fashion the enforcement of sentences. In both
cases, the Court based its review of material constitutionality on the ex-
amination of concretely contested measures of law enforcement. The
constitutional complaint was successful.
c. Defining the Rights of Pupils
The Federal Constitutional Court reached a similar decision con-
cerning the legal status of pupils. In the area of education, essential is-
sues, such as the fundamental requirements for graduation, must be
regulated by law. The existing regulatory scheme, established through
state administrative decrees issued by the Minister of Education, was only
acceptable for a transitional period.48 The Court achieved its constitu-
tional objective by demanding that specific legislation must authorize en-
croachments of basic rights. In the meantime, the states that were
authorized to do so expanded their school laws to contain the essential
regulations, especially with reference to far reaching encroachments on
pupils' rights. The Court left to the federal and state legislatures the task
of discharging the functions required by law, a responsibility properly
falling on the legislatures and not the courts.
3. The Doctrine of Equality
The Federal Constitutional Court has held legal regulations to be
constitutionally acceptable, while at the same time clearly stating that a
change was constitutionally required. Changing economic conditions
have led to increased constitutionally relevant disparities. Such situa-
tions generally involve complex regulatory matters whose-possibly fun-
damental-reorganization should be primarily a task for the legislature
and not for a court.
46 33 BVerfGE 1.
47 40 BVerfGE 276.
48 41 BVerfGE 251.
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a. Discriminatory Valuation Techniques for Taxable Assets
In 1968, the Court decided a case involving the discriminatory valua-
tion and taxation of various types of assets. The dispute involved the
differing valuations of securities, assessed on the basis of fair market
value, and real estate, assessed on the basis of historical cost. As a result
of this disparity, a temporary surge in the economy would raise the value
of the securities for tax purposes, while leaving the value of real estate
unaffected. Because of the potential for a legislative response, the Court
found that the constitutional complaint initiated by the owner of securi-
ties could not succeed. Because of the finality of judicial proceedings, a
finding of past discrimination against the owner of differently assessed
assets would not be possible. It is the legislature's duty to remove in due
time any doubtful discrepancies. 49 This unmistakable appeal by the
Court, however, has as yet not brought about a fundamental revision of
asset valuation.50
b. Income Taxation
The Court also noted inequalities regarding the taxation of civil ser-
vant pensions, which are fully taxable, and workers' social security in-
come, taxable only in part. The favorable tax status of social security
recipients vis-a-vis retired civil servants was originally insignificant be-
cause of the relatively small amount of social security income involved.
In time, however, the situation changed. Social security increased nomi-
nally, reaching a level where it would be subject to tax had it not been for
the contested provision. In its decision in 1980, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court had to decide on taxation for the years 1969-70. The Court
concluded that, for this period, the discrepancy was not significant
enough to constitute a violation of the general principle of equality, as
the actual conditions had changed only gradually. The Court insisted
that because the matter concerned relatively complicated regulatory pro-
visions, amendment could be effected neither quickly nor simply; funda-
mental reform was necessary. The Court stated that the legislature, free
to choose the means for removing the existing distortions, was obliged to
institute the necessary reform measures. The Court did not stipulate any
date by which such reform was to be effected.5 1 No legal regulation is
currently being planned.
5 2
c. The Social Security Act
Unlike the taxation of social security benefits, another appeals deci-
sion produced far reaching reform. The Social Security Act (Rentenver-
sicherung) provided that, regardless of circumstances, widows would
receive widow's benefits following the death of the husband. A widower,
49 23 BVerfGE 242.
50 See 65 BVerfGE 160.
51 54 BVerfGE 11.
52 Panels composed of experts dealt with a still more far-reaching alignment of the retirement
system which also included similar issues. Individual experts and interested parties insist that the
distortion which had been found by the Federal Constitutional Court has again abated.
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on the other hand, was to receive benefits only if his wife had been pri-
marily responsible for the family's support.
As late as 1963, the Federal Constitutional Court had reached the
conclusion that this discrepancy did not constitute a violation of the prin-
ciple of equality between men and women. During this period of the
twentieth century, wives, if gainfully employed at all, generally earned
much less than their husbands. Consequently, the surviving wife would
be much more dependent on the widow's benefit than would a surviving
husband on a widower's benefit. The small number of exceptions could
be disregarded as atypical.
53
In 1975, the Federal Constitutional Court was confronted with a le-
gally as well as factually changed situation. Family law no longer defined
the roles of marriage partners but left them largely for the individuals to
decide. More importantly, the portion of gainfully employed wives had
risen to thirty percent-and continued to rise. The Court reviewed the
provisions in the Social Security Act and found that they remained com-
patible with the constitutional principle of equal treatment of men and
women. The Court stated, however, that an amendment was needed by
the end of the following legislative session, allowing the legislature am-
ple time to respond to the changing social environment and to regulate
anew this difficult matter. 54 The legislature complied with little delay,
implementing extensive reform.55
F. Mere Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Practical Limitations
on Striking Incompatible Provisions
In certain circumstances, a nullification of legal norms would be
even less compatible with the Basic Law than retaining a law that was per
se unconstitutional. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court
found provisions regulating the salaries of civil servants to be incompati-
ble with the constitution. Declaring the provisions unconstitutional,
however, would have eliminated the legal basis for paying such salaries. 56
The Court's decision was based on similar treatment of a prior legal reg-
ulation. The regulation allowed widows, under certain conditions, to de-
mand a refund for contributions made to social security; orphans,
however, were not permitted the same option. Basically, the State
granted services or benefits to certain groups while members of another
group claimed that the grant or denial of such services or benefits vio-
lated the principle of equality and created an unconstitutional loophole
in the law. If the Court were to nullify the favorable provisions-as in the
case of widows-then the inequality would be removed. However, the
petitioners would not be helped. Instead of being as equally well off as
the other group, they would have been worse off. Yet, dogmatically
speaking, it would be nearly impossible to nullify a loophole.
53 17 BVerfGE 1.
54 39 BVerfGE 169.
55 The expediency may be attributable to the interim solution offered by the Bundestag.
56 See, e.g., 8 BVerfGE 1, 19; 26 BVerfGE 79; 32 BVerfGE 199; 40 BVerfGE 296; 56 BVerfGE
146; 56 BVerfGE 175; 64 BVerfGE 367.
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In these situations, several options are available for the legislature to
rectify the constitutional violation. First, it could deprive benefits to
those who had previously received them. Even though this may be politi-
cally unrealistic, it has been done. Second, the legislature could grant
benefits to those previously excluded by even going beyond the target
group. Finally, it could draft an entirely new regulation.
Respect for the creative leeway of the legislature demands that the
Federal Constitutional Court only determine that the alleged discrimina-
tion violates the Basic Law.5 7 This requires the specialized court dealing
with the case to stay the proceedings and await the decision of the legisla-
ture.5 8 The decision concerning the taxation of heads of household, or
half families, is illustrative. After an in-depth analysis of the applicable
legal provisions, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that relative
to the taxation of married couples (with or without children) the tax
treatment of heads of household was discriminatory. The discrepancy
had become gradually aggravated after nominal wages increased consid-
erably.5 9 The tax structure not only violated the principle of equality,
but also conflicted with the constitutional mandate that marriage and
family be protected and promoted.6 0
The Federal Constitutional Court specifically emphasized that the
legislature had various possibilities-by employing means outside of the
tax laws if necessary-to remove the unconstitutional discrimination, but
that it had to be given sufficient time to institute legal reform. Thus, in
the interest of legal security, the norms, albeit unconstitutional, would
remain in effect.6 1 If no new regulations were enacted by December 31,
1984, the unconstitutional provisions could no longer be employed for
purposes of taxing heads of households.6 2 The legislature enacted a new
regulation only days prior to the deadline.
At times, systematic reasons, coupled with the need to guard the cre-
ative freedom of the legislature, prevented the Federal Constitutional
Court from nullifying legal norms in cases involving other constitutional
violations. For example, the Court concluded that the restrictions on
property owners whose land, pursuant to certain regulations, was used
for allotment gardens violated the principle of protection of property.63
The allotment gardens provided a substantial amount of food for certain
segments of the population during the two World Wars and the World
Economic Crisis. Because of the financial reliance of the tenants operat-
ing the gardens, the legislature enacted regulations restricting eviction
57 See, e.g., 62 BVerfGE 256, 289 (terms of notice which differ for workers and employees); 57
BVerfGE 335, 346 (difference in the amount of lump-sum retirement payments); 52 BVerfGE 369,
379 (day off to do housework only for women).
58 22 BVerfGE 349.
59 In this way an increasingly larger group of people became subject to progressive income taxa-
tion. Married couples benefited from the law because of the so-called splitting procedure, whereas
the exemptions granted to heads of household with children had become less and less valuable.
60 GRUNDGESETZ art. 6(l).
61 Preliminary Assessments, a form of assessment provided by the revenue code, would be nec-
essary in the interim period.
62 61 BVerfGE 319.
63 52 BVerfGE 1.
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and instituted rent control. Today, the gardens no longer possess the
same vital significance. In many instances, the property used for allot-
ment gardens has attracted investors interested in developing the land
for apartment housing and the like. Against this background, the Court
decided that the landowners' constitutional right to the protection of
their property had been violated. Rectifying the situation would be diffi-
cult, as the violation was the result of a great number of interconnected
provisions, whose combination ultimately went beyond reasonable en-
cumbrance. Consequently, respect for the creative leeway of the legisla-
ture concerning a new regulation prevented nullification.
Another illustration is provided by the decision concerning revenue
sharing among individual states. 6r4 According to the provisions of the
Basic Law, revenues are to be shared equitably among the Federal
states. 65 The Federal Constitutional Court found that several provisions
of the law were not compatible with the Basic Law. Because the individ-
ual state regulations pertaining to revenue sharing are determined by
law, the Court extended its declaration of incompatibility to the entire
pertinent section of the law. Otherwise there would only remain a torso
of a law which would be incapable of adequately equalizing the financial
resources of the states. Nullification of the pertinent legal provisions
would have been particularly inappropriate. The declaration of incom-
patability signaled the legislature that reform of the revenue sharing laws
was necessary. Moreover, the Court specified in detail what particular
effects the declaration of incompatibility was to have on the past. For
reasons of legal security and in the interest of effective budget planning,
a retrospective treatment of the matter was not needed. However, the
reforms would need to be in effect by the 1988 fiscal year. An interim
compensatory plan would also be necessary.
III. Temporal Effects of Decisions
A. Cases of Nullity
If the Federal Constitutional Court either entirely or partially voids a
norm the effect will be ex tunc. The Law Concerning the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, however, severly restricts the legal significance of this ef-
fect.66 Pursuant to this provision, a new trial is permissible only in
criminal cases, where the final sentence was based on a norm subse-
quently voided. The law also includes those cases involving norms which
are declared incompatible with the Basic Law and cases where the criminal
sentence was based on the interpretation of a norm later declared incom-
patible with the Basic Law by the Federal Constitutional Court.
In all other areas, decisions which can no longer be appealed must
stand. Practically speaking, this legal regulation means that those people
who harbor doubts about the constitutionality of a norm must proceed
against the decisions of courts and authorities by resorting to the appeals
64 Judgment ofJune 24, 1986, 2 BvF 1/83.
65 The enactment of any legislation affecting revenue sharing is customarily preceded by de-
tailed negotiations between the Federal states and the Federal Government.
66 BVerfGG § 79.
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process. If a similar case is already pending before the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, the specialized courts frequently suspend court proceed-
ings in order to await a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court.
B. Appeals Decisions
At first, pure appeals decisions have no direct legal effect, except for
the announcement that a certain unconstitutional condition will no
longer be tolerated in the future and occasionally a directive regarding
which legal situation should later apply. Such announcements have been
made by the Federal Constitutional Court for cases of incompatibility.
C. Declaration of Incompatibility
If a norm is declared incompatible with the Basic Law, then it can no
longer be implemented as extensively as was originally intended. Ac-
cordingly, the specialized courts must set aside their pending cases and
wait until the legislature has passed a new regulation. 67 A provision
which has been declared unconstitutional only can be implemented, en-
tirely or partially, if constitutional reasons, especially those of legal se-
curity, necessitate continued implementation during the transitional
period. However, the situation may require further clarification by the
courts. 68 To avoid potential ambiquity, the Federal Constitutional Court
increasingly enumerates which legal consequences are to be valid in the
period pending passage of a new legal regulation.
Should a law be declared incompatible, the legislature is obligated to
establish a legal situation which is in agreement with the Basic Law. In
the case of a new regulation, the legislators are obligated to promulgate
legislation which also takes into account constitutional principles for the
past, especially in cases that violate the principle of equality. 69
IV. Binding Nature of the Decisions
A. Res Judicata and Legal Force
Like the decisions of any other court of law those of the Federal
Constitutional Court also become res judicata. 70 Res judicata applies
only to the holding and not to the reasoning employed by the Court,
even though such reasoning may be the basis for determining the mean-
ing of the holding. An earlier decision will have res judicata effect on an
issue in a subsequent proceeding only if the matter in dispute is the same
and not merely when only essential legal questions are identical. The
principle of res judicata not only has an effect inter pares but also binds
the Federal Constitutional Court itself.
67 37 BVerfGE 217, 261.
68 See Heubner, Golgen der Verfassungswidrigkeit eines Geseftes ohne Nichtgerklaerng, NJW art. 257
(1982).
69 55 BVerfGE 100. There remains, however, a degree of uncertainty. The legislature promul-
gated transitional regulations in a few cases guided by the above-mentioned differentiation in
BVerfGG § 79(11). See Heyde, Gesetzgeberische Konsequenzen aus der Verfassungswidrig-Erklaerung von
Normen, in FESTSCHRIFr FALER, at 53 (Muenchen 1984).
70 4 BVerfGE 31, 38; 20 BVerfGE 56, 86.
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The legal force of a decision by the Court may be either negatively
nullifying, in the case where incompatible provisions are voided, or pos-
tively determining, in the case where the Court rules on the com-
patability of a law with the Basic Law. The Minister ofJustice is obligated
to publish the holding in the Federal Law Gazette. 71 This also applies to
cases where a specific declaration concerning the constitutionality of a
norm has been made within the context of a constitutional complaint.
72
Thus the Court determines simultaneously for itself the possible legal
force of its decisions.
B. Binding Nature
The Law Concerning the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly re-
quires that the decisions of the Court bind the constitutional bodies of
the Federal Republic and the Federal states, as well as all courts and pub-
lic authorities. 73 In an early decision, for example, the Court held that
the principles governing the allocation of air time by radio and television
stations for political campaigns are binding on all stations (not merely
those involved in the original lawsuit) and with respect to all political
parties.74 Once the Court declares a norm unconstitutional, the legisla-
ture is prevented from repromulgating the same provision. 75
The binding effect extends to the holding and its essential reasoning
but not to every single statement made by the Court in its often compre-
hensive explanations. Accordingly, canonizing individual sentences, pos-
sibly taken out-of-context, from the decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court is inappropriate. In one instance, however, the
Court stipulated that all the arguments of a particular opinion were es-
sential. The case involved the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic
Republic and was strongly criticized in legal literature. 76 Since then, the
Court has refrained from making such stipulations.
The binding effect of decisions by the Court does not extend to ar-
guments which pertain only to the interpretation of so-called simple
laws. This is a matter for the more practically oriented specialized
courts. It is the proper task of the Court, however, to declare binding the
criteria utilized in interpreting such laws. If the Court declares that cer-
tain interpretations of a norm are not compatible with the Basic Law then
no other court may consider this interpretation constitutional. This also
applies in the context of successful constitutional complaints alleging
that certain court decisions interpreting simple laws, otherwise justifiable
and possible, are in violation of the Basic Law.77
71 BVerfGG § 31(11).
72 As mentioned earlier, the Federal Constitutional Court does not make a specific declaration of
the constitutionality of a provision in cases where constitutionality is only indirectly tested. In decid-
ing constitutional complaints, the Court rules only on the disputed decision. Consequently, the
resulting incidental judicial review can be gleaned only from the reasons given in the decision.
73 BVerfGG § 31 (1).
74 7 BVerfGE 99, 109; similar results are found in 8 BVerfGE 122, 141.
75 1 BVerfGE 14, 36.
76 36 BVerfGE 1, 36.
77 40 BVerfGE 88. See also 69 BVerfGE 112 (concerning the limitations of the binding effect).
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C. Is the Federal Constitutional Court Bound by Its Own Decisions?
The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are not binding
on the Court itself. 78 The Court has explicitly declared that it is permit-
ted to dismiss legal opinions stated in earlier decisions, whether essential
to the earlier decision or not.79 Realistically, however, the Court departs
from its own precedent only with great reluctance. Because of its unique
ability to establish binding interpretations of the Basic Law, the Federal
Constitutional Court, as the highest court, must be authorized to correct
legal opinions which are later found inappropriate, excessively far reach-
ing, or based on false precepts.8 0 In accord with this authority, the Court
recently corrected fixed guidelines for building development plans which
were too general. After a detailed analysis of the res judicata effect in
each individual case, the Court arrived at a more differentiating solution,
explicitly stating that it would no longer adhere to earlier case law.81
One must distinguish from the above, decisions of the Court involv-
ing interpretations of the Basic Law which are based on express or im-
plied facts subject to change. Early on, the Court decided that
constitutional provisions may undergo a change of meaning "if new pre-
viously unpredictable facts surface or if known facts appear in a new
light, or assume new significance as a result of their inclusion in the total
history of a development. ' 8 2 The Court emphasized that the specialized
courts, within the framework of concrete judicial review procedures, are
permitted to resubmit questions regarding the constitutionality of a legal
provision. The specialized courts, however, must identify the changing
conditions which prompted a renewed constitutional review of an already
decided issue.83 The following examples illustrate how changes in the
social, economic, technical, moral, or simple legal conditions may lead to
different constitutional assessments.
In the case involving widowers' benefits, the Federal Constitutional
Court arrived at a different result twelve years after its first ruling on the
matter because of changes which had occurred in the simple legal rules
of family law and in the number of people affected by the original deci-
sion.8 4 In addition, the Court worked to redefine the nature of constitu-
tional protection afforded property owners in light of changing socio-
economic conditions. Today, an increasing majority of the population
derives its economic security from gainftil employment and shared retire-
ment benefits, relying less on material assets. From the above discus-
sion, it is evident that not even decisions by the Federal Constitutional
Court are meant to last in all eternity; rather, the decisions must be sub-
78 The Court must, however, observe the res judicata effect.
79 4 BVerfGE 31, 38; 20 BVerfGE 56, 86.
80 Within certain (not easily established) limitations, the interpretation of the Basic Law must
also take into account a change in legal consciousness. The decisions discussed above involving
prisioners and pupils are illustrative.
81 70 BVerfGE 35, 53.
82 2 BVerfGE 380, 401.
83 65 BVerfGE 179, 181.
84 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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jected to careful scrutiny and if necessary must be open to appropriate
correction.
V. The Authority of the Federal Constitutional Court
A. Statutory Law and Judicial (Judge-Made) Law
The constitutional decision to create a constitutional tribunal with
the task of deciding, as a court of last resort, how the Basic Law is to be
interpreted, necessarily produces the potential for far reaching political
repercussions. The Federal Constitutional Court cannot resort to a
"political question doctrine" in the sense that it can refuse a decision
because it would touch on issues of the highest political order. However,
in the interest of the political common good the Court has avoided or
softened the consequences resulting from the traditional doctrine of ex
tunc nullity, which proved to be untenable. While doing so, the Federal
Constitutional Court was obliged to recognize that the laws concerning
the Court merely regulated connected procedural issues in a fragmentary
and rudimentary fashion and that it had to largely create its own proce-
dural law. Later, the Legislature, in the Law Concerning the Federal
Constitutional Court, partially enacted the judicially created procedures.
B. The Authority of the Federal Constitutional Court in Relation to Other
National and International Bodies
1. The Legislature
The Constitution of the Federal Republic, with all its fundamental
rights, necessitates a greater degree of concrete interpretation than other
legal norms. However, the fact that the Federal Constitutional Court, in
its capacity as a court of last resort, is charged with the interpretation of
the Basic Law does not suggest that the Court will always be required to
replace the opinions of other bodies, especially those of the legislative
authority and the specialized courts, with an opinion of its own. In this
context, the concept of judicial self-restraint describes a virtue to be
courted by the judge, yet not so binding as to replace an approach that is
both required and differentiating. Ultimately, even the functional limita-
tions of constitutional jurisdiction follow the entirely different provisions
of the Basic Law which vary in their intensity, their range, and their need
for concretization.
The task of the Federal Constitutional Court to safeguard the Basic
Law may well require the very opposite of restraint; that is, it may de-
mand the determined interference of the Court-even if there is danger
of conflict with another authority.8 5 For example, in the context of the
Court's duty to safeguard the legislative authority between the Federal
Republic and the individual states, the Court properly declared unconsti-
tutional, for lack of federal authority, a federal law concerning the liabil-
ity of the State for its employees, even though the law had been
welcomed enthusiastically by many people.8 6 Additionally, the Basic Law
85 Hesse, Funktionelle Grenzen derVerfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in FESTSCHRIFT HUBER, at 261 (1981).
86 61 BVerfGE 149.
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can demand protection for minorities in a variety of situations, including,
for example, the protection of a small, financially weak state in the case of
revenue sharing as well as the protection of the parliamentary minority in
an investigative committee of the Bundestag.87 Basic human rights may
also mandate the protection of minorities who may have lacked a suffi-
cient lobby for the purpose of asserting themselves politically.
88
On the other hand, it is not the task of a court to formulate basic
political evaluations by replacing the decisions of the legislature with
those of its own. Accordingly, where the Federal Constitutional Court
concluded that there could be no dispute regarding how the legislature
regulated a certain matter, the Court upheld an otherwise narrowing in-
terpretation of the Basic Law on the basis of compatability. Where, how-
ever, the result of value judgments by the legislature led to discrepancies
no longer compatible with the principle of equality-even when observ-
ing a large leeway-the Court left to parliamentary panels the task of
removing the unconstitutional discrimination.
In those instances where the legislature could not ascertain what the
actual effect of a certain legal regulation might be, the Court maintained
the "prognostic leeway" of the legislature. The Court stressed the fact
that it was not the task of the courts, the Federal Constitutional Court
included, to replace the decision of a designated political body with its
own. There would be no legal criteria for such an action. This deference
had an important role in the evaluation of risks involved in the construc-
tion of nuclear power plants,89 as well as in the case concerning the ef-
fects of a law regulating the codetermination of workers in a company.9 0
Depending on the intensity of the constitutional restriction in ques-
tion, the Federal Constitutional Court has established differentiating cri-
teria for the evaluation of legislative prognoses ranging from evidential
control to a control of justifiability and an intensive control of contents.
The Court determines whether the legislative bodies made an effort to
ascertain adequately the current and future relevant facts and to incorpo-
rate them in their decision. For example, the Court determined that the
legislature prohibited a particular form of shipment in the Animal Pro-
tection Act without realizing that for years a small sector of the economy
regularly employed the same form of shipment for certain animals with-
out being criticized. 91
2. The Specialized Courts
As to its relationship with the specialized courts, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court adheres to the policy that in any individual case the design
of the procedures, the ascertainment and evaluation of the facts, as well
as the interpretation and the application of constitutionally unobjection-
able simple legal regulations fall within the province of the authorized
87 67 BVerfGE 100.
88 Another example is the professional regulations which assist the beatipossidentes in protecting
their profession against undesirable competition.
89 49 BVerfGE 89.
90 50 BVerfGE 290.
91 36 BVerfGE 47.
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specialized courts, effectively precluding a review by the Court. The
Court may interfere only in a situation where the decision is based on a
fundamentally incorrect opinion about the significance and the range of
a constitutional right. The limitations of such an interference by the
Court cannot always be clearly determined. To provide for the special
circumstances of a particular case, a certain degree of leeway must be
reserved for judicial discretion. 92 Therefore, the Court strives to avoid
becoming a super court of last resort, taking jurisdiction of the case only
in the event a specific constitutional right is violated. It is important to
differentiate in this context, as well, the extent to which the measures or
decisions of a public authority or court encroach upon the basic rights of
the parties involved. If a decision by a specialized court turns out to be
clearly incomprehensible or untenable, and therefore objectively arbi-
trary, then the court will be overruled by the Court on the basis of
inequality. 9
3
The Federal Constitutional Court will review the procedures imple-
mented by a specialized court in order to determine whether or not they
violate a constitutional principle such as the right to be heard or the right
to a fair criminal trial. Not every violation of simple legal regulations will
prove to be a violation of the Basic Law. Rather, there must be an exami-
nation in every individual case as to whether the constitutionally guaran-
teed right had not already been curtailed.
94
3. International Courts
The problems and issues are somewhat different when trying to de-
termine the relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court and
the international, or supra-national, courts. It is not the mandate of the
international tribunals to preserve and implement national constitutional
law but rather to safeguard the legal order with which the courts have
been charged. In the case of the Court of the European Communities
such order is the multilayered legal system of the members of the Euro-
pean Community, and in the case of the European Court for Human
Rights such order is the Human Rights Convention. To be sure, the in-
creased judicial activity of the European Court for Human Rights makes
conceivable a certainly deplorable trend according to which decisions di-
verge more and more from the content of the basic human right.
The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized, as early as 1974, at a
time when basic rights were hardly talked about in the legal systems of
the European Communities, its authority to measure the legal norms of
the derivative law of the European Communities against the national
constitutional rights of the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, it remained
uncertain in 1979 the extent to which (if at all) the Federal Constitutional
Court was required to adhere to such a law in view of changes in the
92 18 BVerfGE 85, 92; 42 BVerfGE 143, 149.
93 42 BVerfGE 64; 70 BVerfGE 93.
94 60 BVerfGE 305, 310.
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political and legal development.9 5 The Federal Constitutional Court's
resolution of this complex matter has yet to be finalized.
95 37 BVerfGE 271, 277 (1974); 52 BVerfGE 187, 202-03 (1979).
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